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Linguistic impoliteness and religiously aggravated hate crime in England and 
Wales 
 




Despite its centrality to religiously aggravated hate crime recorded in England and Wales, the 
nature of the language used has been neglected in research. This paper, based on a unique dataset, 
aims to rectify this. It takes its approach from the field of linguistic impoliteness, a field that has 
yet to consider hate crime. Therein lies our second aim: to consider whether impoliteness notions 
can be usefully extended to the language of hate crime. In our data, we examine, in particular, 
conventionalized impoliteness formulae, insults, threats, incitement and taboo words. Whilst we 
reveal some linguistic support for the way religiously aggravated hate crime is framed in the law 
and discussed in the legal literature, we highlight areas of neglect and potential ambiguity.  
Regarding impoliteness, we demonstrate its effectiveness as an approach to this data, but we also 
highlight areas of neglect in that literature too, notably, non-conditional threats and incitement.  
 




Compared with the situation in the United States, access to language data relating to the 
courtroom in the UK is highly restricted. Studies make do with historical data (e.g. Archer 2005), 
high-profile cases, such as that of Harold Shipman (convicted of multiple murders in 2000), 
which are occasionally released in the public interest (e.g. Coulthard and Johnson 2007, Chapter 
5), or restricted quantities of data whose near anomalous release seems largely due to the whim of 
an individual judge or other official (e.g. Harris 1984, pers. com.). Our research is based on 
unique access gained to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) records for England and Wales. 
That permission for this access was given is probably a consequence of the fact that our research 
constitutes part of a project conducted under the auspices of the ESRC research centre, Corpus 
Approaches to the Social Sciences (CASS), based at Lancaster University (UK), and supported 
by a former government home Minister, a senior police officer responsible for hate crime policy, 
and the Research and Governance Unit of the CPS, amongst others. 
 Our focus in this paper is on the language manifested as religiously aggravated hate 
crime. Religiously aggravated hate crime in England and Wales constitutes a relatively recent 
crime. The Crime, Security and Anti-terrorism Act of 2001 established provisions for religiously 
aggravated offences, in addition to racially aggravated offences, in response to a backlash of 
incidents against Muslims in Britain, following the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States. Yet, 
to date, there has been no scholarly assessment of precisely what language uttered under what 
circumstance has been deemed to be in violation of that act. This leads to the specific research 
question we will address: what are the linguistic characteristics of speech deemed by legal 
authorities in England and Wales as having the potential to be an indicator of religiously 
aggravated hate crime? We will approach our data with work on linguistic impoliteness (e.g. 
Culpeper 2011) in mind. Work on impoliteness originally developed as a kind of counterpoint to 
linguistic pragmatic work on politeness, notably, the classic and oft cited Brown and Levinson 
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(1987). Language that causes offence is very much the business of impoliteness scholarship. 
However, that scholarship has not hitherto accommodated the language of hate crime. Thus, 
another question this paper addresses is: can impoliteness notions and frameworks be usefully 
extended to the analysis of the language of hate crime? 
 This paper begins with two brief sections. Section 2 considers hate crime as framed by 
laws in England and Wales and also relevant notions in the field of impoliteness. Section 3 
contains a description of our data. The following and longest section, section 4, examines the 
kinds of impoliteness that constitute religiously aggravated hate crime. In the final section, we 
consider the kinds of identity attack evoked. 
 
 
2. Background: Hate crime, the law and impoliteness 
 
2.1 Hate crime in the legal context of England and Wales 
Libraries have been written on the problem of hate speech. But there is a paucity of scholarly 
analysis of the many actual utterances manifesting racist, religious, or some other type of social 
identity based hostility, utterances which aggravate and escalate criminal acts into so-called "hate 
crime". Among the few analyses which seem to have some relation to the project reported in this 
paper is the foundational work in the field of Critical Race Theory (cf. Delgado 1982; Matsuda 
1989).  This work focused on the personal and societal wounds inflicted by racist speech, and as 
a consequence advocated that such speech—and also equivalent “wordless speech” (Matsuda 
1989, 2332)—should be treated as a sui generis category of speech for proscription under 
criminal law in the United States. However, such theorising mostly cited racist hate speech 
generically in the abstract rather than examined the linguistic characteristics of the actual use of 
hate speech. Such a trend of focusing on hate speech in the abstract as against actual usage has 
arguably dominated the scholarly literature on hate speech to date. Even Croom (e.g. 2013), who 
has made an important contribution to the discussion of racial slurs, focuses on the implications 
for semantic theory and philosophical aspects of pragmatics; his work is not driven by large-scale 
empirical analysis of use. Somewhat closer to our project is Asquith (2009), who proposes that 
hate speech, or 'malediction' to use her preferred term, is central to the majority of hate 
violence—marking out such violence as a unique form of interpersonal violence (2009, 162). 
Drawing on Austin’s (1962) performative speech act theory and also Langton’s (1993) speech act 
theory, she postulates the subordinating and silencing impact of performative malediction in the 
case of hate speech. In contrast, in our paper we use more recently developed impoliteness 
notions and frameworks, not to make inferences about the impact of hate speech as Asquith 
theorised, but to analyze the linguistic characteristics of hate speech which brought the use of 
particular utterances to be prosecuted under the criminal law in England and Wales as religiously 
aggravated hate crime.  
 The provisions of current law in England and Wales on hate crime are usefully 
summarized in a Law Commission Report (No. 348; May 2014) dedicated to the topic. There are 
three distinct sets of legal provisions (Section 2.1):  
 
(1) Aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (“CDA”), which deal 
with offences involving racial or religious hostility; 
(2) Offences of stirring up hatred under the Public Order Act 1986 (“POA”), which apply 
to conduct intended, or likely, to stir up hatred based on race, religion and sexual 
orientation; and  
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(3) Enhanced sentencing provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (“CJA”), which 
apply to hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or 
transgender identity. 
 
Note the keywords "aggravated" and "hostility", notions that are repeatedly used in these laws 
and indeed the Law Commission Report. Note also the word "intended", which relates to the 
important issue of "motivation". Finally, it is worth observing that the laws relate to particular 
social groups. We briefly elaborate on all these aspects below. 
 Hostility, according to the Law Commission Report (Section 2.7), is not defined in the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and there is in fact "no standard legal definition". The Law 
Commission Report (Section 2.7) refers to an "ordinary dictionary definition", which "includes 
being 'unfriendly', 'adverse' or 'antagonistic'" and "may also include spite, contempt or dislike". In 
fact, dictionaries vary hugely in their capacity to represent current usage, many being rooted in 
the etymological meanings of the past. However, even if the dictionary did articulate commonly 
and currently understood meanings of hostility, they may not be optimal in the context of hate 
crime. Walters (2013, 49) argues that complex, multifaceted acts of hate, including the "more 
subtle processes of long-term victimization", do not easily fit those common meanings. In 
addition, ordinary meanings of hostility are likely to encompass a very large set of behaviours, a 
much larger set than the legal system and enforcement agencies could possibly deal with. The 
legal solution to this unsatisfactory situation is to put the onus on the court to decide what 
hostility means and whether it applies: "Ultimately, it will be a matter for the tribunal of fact to 
decide whether a defendant has demonstrated, or been motivated by, hostility" (Section 2.7).This 
is not necessarily a perfect solution, of course, as ensuring consistency across cases will be very 
difficult. 
 According to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Section 28.1, quoted in the Law 
Commission Report, 2014, Section 2.3), an aggravated offence is considered to have taken place 
if either hostility is demonstrated ((a) below) or motivation is proven ((b) below), or both these 
factors take place: 
 
(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the 
offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the victim’s 
membership (or presumed membership) of a racial or religious group; or 
 
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or 
religious group based on their membership of that group. 
 
Regarding what offences might be deemed to involve aggravated demonstrations of "hostility", 
the Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.4) offers a list of possibilities. Excluding offences 
involving physical harm, we are left with "threatening, abusive or insulting conduct", 
"harassment" and "putting people in fear of violence", all of which could be achieved 
linguistically. No specific linguistic examples are offered here. Elsewhere in the Law 
Commission Report, and indeed in the wider literature, the few linguistic examples given are 
almost always insults. However, the Law Commission Report (2014) offers an interpretation of 
what constitutes a demonstration of hostility, and includes some linguistic observations: 
 
2.10 The demonstration of hostility will tend to involve words or gestures, but may be 
manifested in other ways, for example, by wearing insignia such as a swastika or singing 
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2.11 Whether hostility was demonstrated is a wholly objective question. The victim’s 
perception of, or reaction to, the incident is not relevant. Also immaterial is the fact that 
the defendant’s frame of mind was such that, while committing the offence, he or she 
would have used abusive terms towards any person by 
reference to other personal characteristics.[...] 
 
2.12 Whether hostility was demonstrated will be a question of fact for the tribunal to 
decide in light of all the circumstances. In Pal, Simon Brown LJ stated that the use of 
racially abusive insults will ordinarily be sufficient to prove demonstration of racial 
hostility. 
 
It should be noted here that the claim that demonstration is a "wholly objective question" seems 
to be restricted to perceptions of participants at the time of the purported crime, but not the 
courtroom. Discussing the meaning of "racial group", the Law Commission Report (2014, 
Section 2.22) comments on the interpretation of words: 
 
Words are to be construed as generally used in the jurisdiction of England and Wales [...] 
The Court of Appeal has said that it is for the jury to decide whether the use of a 
particular term is a demonstration of hostility. 
 
This, then, allows for the fact that words and expressions do not have fixed values but vary 
according to context, though no guidance is given on the contextual issues at stake. Whilst racial 
insults such as black bastard or Paki might present clearer cases of hostility demonstrated against 
a racial group to the courts, insults such as bloody foreigners are likely to be more uncertain 
(Walters 2013, 60, who also cites relevant court cases). And even apparently clear-cut cases 
might be challenged; Walters (2013, 61) notes a claim that black bastard is "'everyday language 
on the streets of London'".  
 Walters (2013, 50) points out that some commentators have been concerned that the 
demonstration of hostility, as denoted by (a), is considered  sufficient in itself to count as an 
aggravated offence, as it might "unfairly capture offenders who unthinkingly 'demonstrate' 
hostility in the 'heat of the moment', but who for all intents and purposes are not bigots or haters". 
Indeed, in some legal cases the defence has argued that although hostility was demonstrated, it 
was not intended (Walters 2013, 63). This brings us to the alternative factor for conviction, 
namely, motivation, as denoted by (b). Motivation is not quite the same as intention: an intention 
involves a plan to direct actions towards particular ends, whereas motivation involves reasons 
why one might have the intention. The Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.18) notes that 
motivation is probably even more difficult to prove than intention. It suggests that proof may 
come from "evidence relating to previous conduct or associations" (2014, Section 2.17), 
including evidence of expressions of racist views or membership of a racist group. The idea, then, 
is to connect the individual to evidence of an ideology of hate from which motivations might 
arise. However, Iganski (2008) points out that most hate crimes are not the result of conscious 
intentions flowing from such ideologies, but arise in local contexts in the 'heat of the moment', 
often to address a perceived grievance. Interestingly, Walters (2013, 70, original emphasis) 
argues that what matters is not an intention to be racist or anti-religious but that "the offender 
intends to express the insult and is aware that to do so will likely demean the victim's identity". 
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 Regarding the social groups covered by the legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(amended by the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) allows for prosecutions for a 
specific list of offences for racially and religiously aggravated offences. The Criminal Justice Act 
2003 provides some protection for other groups but not in the same way. It suggests that during 
the sentencing phase, a court must give an enhanced sentence if an offence was aggravated by a 
demonstration of hostility towards the victim based on sexual orientation, transgender identity, or 
disability (or racial or religious group membership). In other words, the "identities" protected by 
the enactment of 'aggravated offences' are just racial and religious groups, but the other three 
protected groups get some coverage at the sentencing stage. It should be noted that the notion of 
"identity" is not operationalised in the laws we have been discussing here, or in the Law 
Commission Report (2014). 135 instances of the term "identity" out of the total of 170 in that 
report are simply part of the fixed expression "transgender identity" (a further 14 occur as part of 
the expression "gender identity", and the remainder relate to sexual orientation). Instead, as we 
saw in the quotation from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Section 28.1), legal documents 
simply refer to 'membership' or 'presumed membership' of social group.  
 
 
2.2 Linguistic impoliteness 
Our aim in this brief section on linguistic impoliteness is not to offer a complete overview of 
impoliteness, but to concentrate on aspects of impoliteness relevant to notions raised in the 
previous section on the language of hate crime in the legal context of the UK. 
 The notion of hostility is not unknown in the world of impoliteness. In fact, it is part of 
the label "reasonable hostility" that Tracy (2008) uses to refer to impoliteness (or what she calls 
"face-attack") in situations where it is considered appropriate. However, there are also many 
other broadly similar labels used in the literature on linguistic offence, including "rudeness", 
"incivility", "verbal aggression" and "face-aggravation" (see Culpeper 2011, chapter 1, for a 
discussion of and references relating to some of these labels), and many more are used outside 
academia. Each has their own semantic characteristics. Culpeper (2011, 72) proposes that the 
label "impoliteness" is used as a cover term for these related labels, not least because the word 
"impoliteness" has very little currency and is thus ripe for appropriation as a technical term. This 
is the policy we adopt in this paper. 
 Let us pick up on one of the labels just mentioned, the one containing the word 
"aggravation". Locher and Bousfield (2008, 3), reviewing the contributions to their edited 
collection on impoliteness, comment that, whilst there is "no solid agreement as to what 
'impoliteness' actually is", the "lowest common denominator" seems to be: "impoliteness is 
behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context". The notion of 'face' must qualify as 
one of the most frequently mentioned concepts in work on impoliteness, especially in earlier 
work (e.g. Lachenicht 1980; Beebe 1995; Culpeper 1996; Bousfield 2008). It is a technical notion 
that has helped delineate and operationalize both politeness and impoliteness. It could also help 
with hostility in the context of hate crime. Most (im)politeness works draw on Goffman (1967: 5) 
for their definition of face, where it is defined as follows: 
 
the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume 
he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of 
approved social attributes.  
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Note that face in Goffman's definition is not just the positive values that you yourself want, but 
what you can claim about yourself from what others assume about your actions. This is a crucial 
point: Goffman's notion of face involves the public mediation of identity. This idea could deepen 
Walter's (2013, 70) argument that the key to hostile insults should be the speaker's awareness that 
they are likely to demean the victim's identity. From the point of view of face, hostile insults are 
not about the psychological properties of either the victim or the defendant before the event in 
question, but about assumptions concerning what might conflict with the kind of positive values 
(including those involving identity) the victim might want to claim during a particular interaction. 
 Given that face involves an "image of self", it seems a short-step from discussions of face 
to discussions of identity. However, the concepts of face and identity have generally been 
pursued separately, at least until recently, when we see a particular focus on (im)politeness and 
identity emerging. One might note work such as Spencer-Oatey 2007, Locher 2008 and 
especially Garcés-Conejos Blitvich e.g. 2009, 2013, along with the special issue on face, identity 
and (im)politeness in the Journal of Politeness Research, 2013, volume 9, issue 1 (see especially 
Garcés-Conejos Blitvich, Lorenzo-Dus, and Bou-Franch, 2013), and also the discussion in 
Blitvich and Sifianou (forthcoming).What is of particular note for the current paper is the 
increasingly strong acknowledgement, in the light of identity research in particular, that face is 
not simply the property of an individual. For example, Spencer-Oatey's (e.g. 2008) model of 
"rapport management", in which she describes politeness, impoliteness and other interpersonal 
notions, proposed two major types of face: 'quality face' (which encompasses personal qualities, 
such as intelligence or competence), and 'social identity face' (which encompasses social 
identities and roles, such as a Muslim or mother).1 The latter is obviously of particular relevance 
to our data. 
 To the non-academic, it is perhaps a no-brainer that certain words and expressions 
demonstrate impoliteness. However, this is a site of some dispute in the impoliteness literature. 
For example, Fraser and Nolen (1981, 96) state: 
 
no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. We often take certain expressions to be 
impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are 
used that determines the judgment of politeness. (Fraser and Nolen 1981, 96) 
 
And this is echoed by other researchers (e.g. Watts 2003; Locher 2006). To be fair, these 
researchers were reacting to earlier work which seemed to treat words and expressions as stable 
vehicles for politeness or impoliteness, and also they do sometimes acknowledge that particular 
words or expressions lend themselves to particular (im)politeness perceptions. Indeed, people are 
able to proffer judgements about the degree of politeness of any word or expression even when it 
is out of context. The explanation for this, as Holtgraves (2005, 89) notes, is that "people possess 
a schematic knowledge regarding language and its social implications, knowledge that exists 
independent of any occasion of use". The wording is important here: the claim is that it is 
"independent of any occasion of use" and not that it is independent of context. Words and 
expressions become increasingly associated with their contexts of use so that those contexts 
become part of the meanings of those words and expressions with the result that they can be 
interpreted with the associations of their contexts even when they are used in atypical contexts. 
This view, broadly speaking, is in tune with Terkourafi's (e.g. 2001, 2002, 2003) proposals about 
politeness formulae arising as a result of becoming conventionalized for certain contexts of use; 
and Culpeper (2010) builds on those proposals for similar claims about impoliteness. Note here 
that there is absolutely no claim that such items have completely stable (im)polite meanings, that 
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they are (im)polite in all contexts of use, but simply that they have default interpretations. Again, 
this idea is in tune with Walter's (2013, 70) argument that the key to hostile insults should be the 
speaker's awareness that they are likely to demean the victim's identity. 
 Motivation is not much discussed in the impoliteness literature, although one can find 
comments on situational factors such as "trigger events" and provocation. However, there is a 
fairly prominent thread on intentionality in the context of impoliteness, that is to say, where 
somebody intended to offend, had the requisite skill to carry out offence, hatched a plan to carry 
out that offence, and then carried it out with full awareness. One reason for this prominence is 
that it helps distinguish 'genuine' cases from cases where somebody inadvertently caused offence 
(through, for example, a faux pas). Recollect the concerns mentioned in the previous section with 
respect to the framing of hate crime law and the possibility of unintentional demonstration of 
hostility. Regarding impoliteness, consider Bousfield’s (2008, 72; our emphasis) definition: 
 
Impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive 
verbal face-threatening acts which are purposefully delivered: (1) unmitigated […], and 
/or (ii) with deliberate aggression […] 
 
This definition clearly takes the communicator's perspective (i.e. the intention of the 
communicator in doing X). From the target’s point of view, we are actually dealing with 
perceptions of the communicator's intention. In fact, work on (im)politeness over the last ten 
years has emphasized the relative importance of what others make of a communicator's intentions 
compared with what the communicator's intentions might actually have been (e.g. Locher and 
Watts 2008). One practical issue in tune with this line is that we have no direct way of reaching 
into the heads of the speakers/communicators to discover what they intended (and sometimes 
even communicators are not sure what they intended or construct the intention post hoc). 
Moreover, it emerged in Culpeper's (2011) analysis of 100 narrative reports from British 
undergraduates of impoliteness events, and also in the work of others (e.g. Gabriel 1998), that 
sometimes people construe an act as both unintentional and offensive, and also describe it as 
impolite. Interestingly, Culpeper (2001) argued that whilst the offensive consequences of the 
utterance might not have been considered intentional, the informant may well have considered 
them foreseeable, and thus consequences that should have been prevented. This is perfectly in 




3. The data and method 
 
3.1 Data 
We consider CPS case records for all prosecuted cases that were flagged as ‘religiously 
aggravated’ in the 2012-13 financial year and tried in the Crown Courts.2 In 2012-13, according 
to records produced for the research by the CPS Management Information Team, 66 cases going 
before the Crown Courts were flagged as religiously aggravated on the CPS Case Management 
System, involving 90 defendants in total. Although flagged as 'religiously aggravated', not all of 
the cases included indictments for religiously aggravated offences. As the aims of our research 
were to explore the linguistic triggers for the prosecution of religiously aggravated offences, the 
selection of cases we analyzed was confined to all those with indictments for religiously 
aggravated offences - representing all prosecutions in the Crown Courts for religiously 
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aggravated offences in 2012-13. Given our interest in the linguistic component of religious 
aggravation, we also included a small number of cases in which some type of religious 
aggravation was mentioned in either the indictment or elsewhere in the case records, even though 
there was not an indictment for a religiously aggravated offence. With these selection criteria, our 
sample consisted of 17 cases in total. Each case has three sets of documents: 
 
(1) The Report to Crown Prosecutor for Charging Decision (referred to as the MG3 form) 
capturing the details of the case as reported by the victim(s), any witnesses and police 
officers along with the defendant’s response to the allegations, the rationale for prosecution 
along with a weighing of the potential strengths and limitations of the prosecution’s case. 
 
(2) The Record of Taped Interview (ROTI) providing a transcript of the defendant’s 
interview(s) by the police. 
 
(3) The Indictment detailing the charges faced by the defendant(s) in court. 
 
The quantity of documentation for each case varied considerably. In some cases, ‘no comment’ 
interviews provided only a few hundred words for analysis in a ROTI, whilst in others, lengthy 
interviews extended as long as 11,824 words. 
 We made no a priori assumptions about whether any particular utterance or behaviour 
constitutes impoliteness or hate crime, or indeed anything else. It should be noted that we make no 
claims about the "truth" or "reality" of the crime. Utterances and behaviours appear in the 
documents because they have been deemed relevant to the crime by a participant, that is, a victim, 
a witness, a police officer, or sometimes the defendant. It follows, therefore, that we are not 
getting a full transcript of what was said in the crime scene or a full detailing of the context, but a 
particular selection. Nevertheless, it is a selection deemed relevant to the law, and, moreover, it is 




This paper is based on the analysis of all the utterances and other communicative behaviours 
represented in documents identified in section 3.1, and which are (a) alleged to have been 
produced by the defendant(s) at the scene of the alleged crime, and (b) have at least some claim to 
being offensive. Identifying and collecting these utterances/behaviours for our dataset was 
straightforward as they were nearly always marked as direct speech report, as illustrated by 
example [1] (no attempt is been made to tidy-up, standardize or otherwise adjust the data 
represented in this paper). 
 
[1] The customer alleged that she was unhappy with the quality of oranges she was seeking to 
 buy and complained to the stall-holder. Allegedly, in response, the stall-holder verbally 
 abused the customer, and by her account, told her to “Fuck off” and called her “You 
 fucking foreign lady”. 
 
In addition, we admitted three borderline examples which, though a form of indirect speech report, 
provided a good idea of the orientation of the utterance in the context of the alleged crime, as 
illustrated by example [2]. 
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[2] The letters reportedly “The letters attacked the VICTIM's religious beliefs, in particular the 
 use of Tarot Cards and that they were preaching the words of the devil.” We do not have 
 available evidence of the actual words used in the letters. 
 
We also included any specific negative behaviours (e.g. spitting, a cutting of the throat gesture). 
 Our key, though not only, analytical framework was to apply the categories for 
conventionalized impoliteness formulae identified in Culpeper (2011, chapter 4). A 
conventionalized impoliteness formula is a regularly occurring bundle of language or a non-verbal 
sign in which context-specific offensive effects are encoded to a degree. Culpeper (2011) initially 
identified the various types of impoliteness formulae by studying discourses in which impoliteness 
is central (e.g. army training, exploitative TV shows, graffiti), drawing on a varied collection of 
data accumulated over 15 years. The limitation of these contexts is that they reflect contexts which 
are either institutional or often at least partly contrived; they do not include those more everyday 
moments of impoliteness - on the bus, with a shop assistant, with a member of your family, and so 
on. So, in addition, Culpeper (2011) deployed an impoliteness event report form filled in by 100 
British undergraduates. Having thus generated a range of impoliteness types, the next step taken 
was to establish whether these formulae are regularly associated with impoliteness effects, and 
thus can be claimed to be conventionalized. Culpeper (2011) checked all items in the two-billion 
word Oxford English Corpus (see: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/words/the-oxford-english-
corpus), in order to make sure that more than 50% of the instances of each type occurred in 
contexts which could be interpreted as involving impoliteness. The resulting list of formulae that 
met this criterion is displayed in Table 1 (further information about the formulae can be found in 
Culpeper 2011: chapter 4). 
 
Table 1. Conventionalized impoliteness formulae (drawn from Culpeper 2011, 135-136) 
 
Impoliteness formulae type Example 
Insult (Personalised negative vocatives) you fucking moron 
Insult (Personalised negative assertions) you are such a bitch 
Insult (Personalised negative references) your little arse 
Insult (Personalised third-person negative references in the hearing 
of the target) 
the daft bimbo 
Pointed criticisms/complaints 
that is total crap 
Challenging or unpalatable questions and/or presuppositions why do you make my life impossible 
Condescensions that's being babyish 
Message enforcers listen here 
Dismissals fuck off 
Silencers shut the fuck up 
Threats I'm going to bust your fucking head off if you 
touch my car 
Curses and ill-wishes fuck you 
 
Some items that one might expect to be in Table 1 simply did not occur frequently enough. For 
example, taboo words can trigger a judgement of impoliteness, but they seem to do this per se 
rarely – a mere two cases out of 100 in Culpeper's (2011, 136) report data. In most cases, taboo 
words operate in conjunction with impoliteness formulae such as those in Table 1. Also, we should 
note that, whilst Culpeper (2011) acknowledges the existence of conventionalized non-verbal 
impoliteness behaviour (e.g. spitting, a two or one fingered gesture), he does not investigate them. 
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 We then coded and segmented our dataset with the categories comprising conventionalized 
impoliteness formulae. This was a relatively simple process, as most of the data are reported as 
fragments of direct speech which neatly fit a category. For instance, in example [1], "fuck off" is a 
Dismissal, and "You fucking foreign lady" is an Insult (specifically, the variant that comprises 
personalised negative vocatives). If an utterance/behaviour repeated an impoliteness formula (e.g. 
"fuck off, fuck off"), each received a separate coding. If the utterance/behaviour ran together a mix 
of impoliteness formulae (e.g. "fuck off you fucking foreign lady"), each received a separate and 
different coding. As we elaborate in the following section, just a small number of 
utterances/behaviours did not fit the categories of conventionalized impoliteness, but instead relied 
on the generation of impolite implications. Our dataset comprises 168 codings in total. The 
upcoming sections will note the relative proportions the different types of impoliteness consume of 
that 168, and also examine their nature more closely. 
 
 
4.The building blocks of the language of hate crime 
 
4.1 Prefabricated or creative? 
Our first goal was to establish whether the language of our data is comprised of language 
associated with impoliteness contexts; in other words, whether it is comprised of language more 
likely to offend, that is, conventionalized or pre-fabricated impoliteness formulae. 89.3% (149) of 
our dataset were coded conventionalized impoliteness formulae. Our data is indeed regularly 
associated with impoliteness. Interestingly, our figure of 89.3% is more than double the figure of 
41% for impoliteness events reported by British students in Culpeper (2011, 155). Why is there 
this difference? 
 Relying primarily on pre-fabricated chunks held in memory involves less mental effort. It 
is less creative. Creativity in impoliteness tends to go hand in hand with entertaining functions of 
impoliteness and often social solidarity functions, as is frequently the case with banter (Culpeper 
2011, 207-215, 233-244). One might reasonably expect less thought-full language production in 
the typical situations of our data, that is, highly emotional and stressful situations. However, we 
cannot ignore another factor that may have a bearing: impoliteness that is more explicit – a 
conventionalized formula – is more likely to get reported than impoliteness that is more 
implicational in nature. Consider this utterance that was reported in our data:  
 
[3]  See you next Saturday. 
 
Superficially, it is innocuous, but the context allows an offensive interpretation. It was allegedly 
said by a defendant to the victim(s) as he was taken away by police. Significantly, he is alleged to 
have regularly turned up on Saturdays to harass the victim(s). Hence, there is an implied threat to 
do the same next Saturday. Such cases tend not to get reported, because they are usually more 
complex and do not fit the discussions surrounding the law which focus on "words" and "terms" 
imbued with hostility (see section 2.1). Whether such implicational cases can cause as much or 
even more offence than conventionalized formulae has not been the subject of sufficient research. 
  
 
4.2 The hate crime language mix: Coercive impoliteness 
Despite the obvious centrality of language to the manifestation of hate crime, the law, as noted in 
section 2.1, offers little indication as to nature of relevant language. Figure 1 displays the 
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percentages and frequencies with which different types of conventionalized impoliteness formulae 
appear in our data. 
 
Figure 1. Types of impoliteness formulae(the Y axis indicates raw frequency; the percentages on top of each 




Insults and threats are typical of coercive impoliteness (Culpeper 2011, 225-233), that is, 
"impoliteness that seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the 
producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected" (2011, 252). Culpeper's 
notion of coercive impoliteness was partly modelled on work on aggression in social psychology, 
especially Tedeschi and Felson (1994). Consider their definition of a coercive action:  
 
A coercive action is an action taken with the intention of imposing harm on another person 
or forcing compliance. Actors engaged in coercive actions expect that their behaviour will 
either harm the target or lead to compliance, and they value one of these proximate 
outcomes. The value they attach to compliance or harm to the target arises from their belief 
about the causal relationship between compliance or harm and the terminal values. There 
are many values that might be pursued through coercive means. For example, actors might 
value harm to the target because they believe it will result in justice, or they might value 
the target's compliance because they believe it will lead to tangible benefits. 
 
There are two aspects of this definition that are particularly relevant to our data. First, coercive 
action is not merely a matter of forcing behavioural compliance, but includes the notion of social 
harm, which involves "damage to the social identity of target persons and a lowering of their 
power or status" and "may be imposed by insults, reproaches, sarcasm, and various types of 
impolite behaviour" (Tedeschi and Felson 1994,171). It is about using impoliteness to reduce the 
target's relative symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991), thereby boosting the speaker's symbolic benefits 
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(which in turn may lead in the future to material benefits). Second, the specific example of the 
motivation for harm, namely, that it will result in justice, fits a strong thread in our data. The 
realignment of values attempted in our data sometimes seems to be perceived as having moral 
backing, as being a matter of re-balancing things, of redressing a grievance. As noted in section 
2.1, redressing a grievance has been mentioned as a motivation for hate crime.  Tedeschi and 
Felson (1994, 218) refer to the notion of "distributive justice", which concerns "a fair allocation of 
benefits, a fair distribution of responsibilities, and recognition of performance or effort", and note 
that violations of this notion "may form the basis of a grievance and lead to coercive interactions". 
Example [4] illustrates this, and also the fact that the basis of the grievance need not have 
common-sense logic (all data examples in this paper follow the spellings and typographical style, 
e.g. the use of capitals, of the original). 
 
[4] MY TWO MATES WHERE KILLED IN AFGHANISTAN BY MUSLIMS, SO ILL 
 KILL YOU 
 
In fact, the perceived moral backing underpinning the grievance seemed to empower the 
defendants. In one police interview, the defendant, a member of the English Defence League 
(EDL), an extremist nationalist right-wing group, defends his actions by alluding to the alleged 
prior burning of poppies (a symbol to commemorate the death of British and Commonwealth 
soldiers after the First World War) by Muslim groups (DS = the police officer rank of detective 
sergeant): 
 
[5] DS SURNAME: What’s your feelings about, how do you feel about going to a place of 
 worship and abusing with violence the people in the, in the mosque? 
 
 FORENAME SURNAME: How do you feel about them burning poppies? 
 
 The following sub-sections focus on the most frequent types of impoliteness formulae in 
our data, and then considers how they are intensified. 
 
 
4.3A focus on insults 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, if discussions surrounding hate crime mention the language 
involved, they strongly gravitate towards insults. Given their high frequency of occurrence in 
Figure 1, constituting 47% of the conventionalized impoliteness formulae and more than double 
any other category, this is justified. Also, as we will see in section 5, they are a convenient 
linguistic carriage for connecting something negative with group membership. However, not all 
insults are the same. Almost all the insults in the data are of two types, as illustrated below: 
 
[6] Personalized negative vocative  
  idiots 
  you cunt 
  dirty muslim scum 
  you fucking protestant pig 
  YOU FUCKING PIG LOVING, CURRY MUNCHING, SAND MONEY3 CUNT 
 
Personalized negative assertion 
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  you are a terrorist 
  you're a fucking Muslim 
  You don't answer coz u no u lowest of the low 
 
The fact that these were the most frequent types of insult is not at all distinctive of our data; the 
datasets examined in Culpeper (2011) also had a preponderance of these types. What is distinctive 
about the data is that five of the reported insults involved alleged behaviours rather than speech, 
including: spitting and urinating at a mosque, tearing pages out of the Koran and throwing it down 
in front of the victims, and pulling-off the victim's head scarf and throwing it on the floor. Just as 
with verbal insults, such behaviours are symbolic violations of identities. 
 The fact that insults are the predominant type of impoliteness in our data by far (more than 
twice as frequent as threats, for example) is a distinctive feature of our data. For instance, Kleinke 
and Bös (2015) studied impoliteness in the BBC's forum Have Your Say, using some of the same 
impoliteness categories as those used in this paper (i.e. from Culpeper 2011). They discovered that 
'pointed criticism' was the most dominant category, accounting for 21% of their impoliteness 869 
codings (2015, 56), even exceeding insults. In contrast, this category does not appear in our data. 
Example [7] illustrates pointed criticism.  
 
[7]  Catholicism is responsible for maliciously keeping half of the worlds population in poverty 
(Kleinke and Bös 2015, 55) 
 
A key difference between insults and pointed criticism is personalization, usually achieved 
explicitly through the use of second person pronouns. Insults typically target the addressee’s face, 
or phenomena (e.g. group membership) in which they have face invested; pointed criticism targets 
a third party. However, there is leakage between these types of impoliteness. Compare examples 
[8] and [9], both from our data: 
 
[8] you’re a terrorist  
 
[9] the Islamic religion is bullshit (addressed to Islamic victim) 
 
"You're a terrorist" is obviously an insult: the use of the second person pronoun picks out the 
target; that target is associated with what is widely viewed as a repugnant group, terrorists, and 
thereby their face is potentially violated. "The Islamic religion is bullshit" denigrates the Islamic 
religion, and if the target has face invested in it, then their face is potentially violated. 
Superficially, example [9] looks like the pointed criticism of example [7]: both make a negative 
claim about a religion. However, the difference in context is crucial. [9], "The Islamic religion is 
bullshit", although not explicitly marked by a second person pronoun, is alleged to have been 
addressed to the Muslim victims present in the physical situation in which it was said. In other 
words, it implicitly targets those addressees. In contrast, [7], "Catholicism is responsible for 
maliciously, etc", is said in a context where the presence of Catholics is not salient. Of course, 
there is potential for leakage between these two impoliteness types. For example, if a Catholic 
happened to be in the communicative context of example [7], it is quite possible that they may 
have taken that utterance as an insult, rather than pointed criticism. The context then is crucial. 
Moreover, in a legal context, the difference is significant. A possible defence could be that it was 
not an insult, just a pointed criticism. A religiously-oriented insult clearly breaks the law: "the 
offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility" (see section 2.1; our emphasis). 
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Religiously-oriented pointed criticism does not. Whilst the court records sometimes include 
indications as to the direction of talk (e.g. "at the victim"), often this is matter of inference based 




4.4A focus on threats 
Threatening conduct is associated with hate crime, and so it is no surprise to see threats as the 
second most frequent formula. However, the particularly important point is that those in our data 
are distinctive. Culpeper (2011, 136) identifies three structures for threats in impoliteness contexts, 
the most frequent being given in example [10] (the example is constructed out of his data to 
display prototypical components constituting the threat): 
 
[10] [I’ll/I’m/we’re] [gonna] [smash your face in/beat the shit out of you/box your ears/bust 
your fucking head  off/straighten you out/etc.] [if you don't] [X] 
 
All structures studied in that work are conditional threats. Similarly, Limberg (2009), a paper that 
deals with impoliteness and threats, especially responses to threats, focuses on conditional threats, 
confining non-conditional threats to very occasional brief remarks. In contrast with these studies, 
our data contain no conditional threats. Instead, our data contain: (1) 26 non-conditional threats, 
(2) one action characterized as a threat (allegedly, somebody making a shooting gun motion at the 
victims), and (3) 8 implied threats (e.g. "you're all fucking dead"4). Example [11] illustrates a non-
conditional threat. 
 
[11]  I'm gonna kill you and your family 
 
 Holger (2009, 1382) remarks that the "implication that the addressee draws from a 
conditional threat utterance allows him/her to correct the behavior and/or comment on the implicit 
reproach". Non-conditional threats offer no such explicit opportunities for correction. If there is 
implicitly an issue associated with the non-conditional threats in our data that needs correction, it 
would likely be a grievance, as mentioned in section 2.2. In fact, conditional threats are more like 
commands, controlling the addressee’s future action; non-conditional threats, as in our data, 
express a commitment to harm the addressee in the future (see the discussion in Martínez-Cabeza 
2009). It should be noted, however, that the future orientation of threats just described is present in 
the semantics, rather than the effect of the act. A perlocutionary effect, to use speech act 
terminology (e.g. Austin 1962), of a threat, whether conditional or non-conditional, is 
intimidation. This takes place at the point of utterance, not in the future. This clearly fits the 
framing of the law, notably of "putting people in fear of violence" (Section 2.2). 
  
 
4.5 A focus on incitement and negative expressives 
Incitement was not mentioned in section 2.1 because it is not mentioned in the laws outlining 
offences of religious aggravation, nor in the offences that can be subject to aggravation, as 
suggested in the Law Commission Report (2014, Section 2.4). It is discussed at some length, 
however, in the Law Commission Report (2014, 2.33-56) under the heading "The Stirring up 
offences", the focus being whether incitement to religious hatred being explicitly included in the 
law relating to religiously aggravated hate crime is desirable and the extent to which it might 
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already be covered in other laws. As far as the impoliteness literature is concerned, incitement 
appears nowhere.   
 Paradigm examples in our data include: 
 
[12] [shouted] let's kill him 
 
[13] GET THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY 
 
As these examples illustrate, such utterances involve hortative or imperative constructions. The 
notion of incitement raises interesting issues for speech act theory (e.g. Austin 1962), and has been 
discussed at length in legal studies. Kurzon (1998) usefully discusses incitement in the contexts 
both of speech act theory and the law. We will not rehearse such discussions in detail, but raise 
some of the relevant complexities aired, especially as they apply to our data.  
 In the USA, a touchtone for the discussion of incitement is the First Amendment and its 
provisions for the protection of free speech. A particularly important case is Brandenburg vs Ohio 
(1969). Here, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Brandenburg, a member of the Klu 
Klux Klan, who had been charged under Ohio state law. They overturned the conviction because 
the utterances at issue were considered "mere advocacy" rather than "incitement to imminent 
lawless action" (395 U.S. 444; see: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444). Not 
surprisingly, this rather tenuous distinction has stimulated much legal discussion (e.g. how 
imminent must imminent action be to be considered so?). What interests us here are the actual 
utterances in the case. They included "Send the Jews back to Israel" and "Bury the niggers" – 
ostensibly, exactly the same kind of utterances as those of our data. However, there are differences 
in the contexts in which these were said, and therefore differences in the potential range of effects. 
Brandenburg reportedly made those utterances at a Ku Klux Klan meeting; in other words, 
amongst like-minded people. The utterances in our data which we have labelled incitement were 
made, as far as we can work out, in the hearing of the victims. Moreover, not only is fairly 
immediate lawless action (e.g. assault) possible, but – and this is the key point – the mere 
expression of such utterances potentially causes immediate social harm by instilling fear in the 
victims. Similar to threats, the effect is one of intimidation. Note here that cases such as these 
require a complex view of speech acts, such as that articulated in the pioneering work of Thomas 
(1995) (see especially p. 195-207).The inciter, addressing an accomplice, may perform an act of 
incitement which indirectly is intended as and/or taken to be a threat by a bystander (victim). 
 This is not to say that all of our examples are unambiguously examples of incitement. 
Consider example [14]: 
  
[14]  Fuck the Koran 
 
This is ambiguous between an incitement to inflict physical harm, as might be more transparently 
conveyed by "Let's fuck up the Koran" (note here that one of our cases concerned tearing pages 
out of the Koran), and an expression of negative feelings, as might be more transparently 
conveyed by "I don't give a fuck about the Koran". Both, of course, are highly offensive, targeting 
a key symbol of a religion, though not in the same way. Compare [14] with [15], which was 
allegedly spoken by a Scotsman to English police officers: 
 
[15]  Fuck the Queen 
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It is of course improbable that in this context this could be anything other than the expression of 
negative feelings – not only is the idea of causing physical harm to the Queen a rather remote 
possibility, but the target audience, English police officers, constitute unlikely candidates for 
incitement to cause physical harm. Instead, it is the expression of negative feelings, targeting the  
identities of the English police officers by orienting an attack to the symbolic figurehead of their 
nation state. In order to reinforce the argument in this paragraph, one might reflect on the meaning 
of [13] had it been said in England a little over 400 years ago during the reign of Elizabeth I. At 
that time, in the context of national paranoia about plots to overthrow and/or assassinate the 
Queen, an incitement reading would be more probable. 
 
 
4.6 Intensification: Taboo words 
Young's (2004,300) research on 'hurtful communication' reveals that: 
 
How the message was stated was pivotal in determining recipients' appraisals of it. 
Comments that were stated harshly, abrasively or that used extreme language were likely to 
be viewed more negatively. 
 
One of the most striking features of our data is the high density of taboo words. 50.3% of the 
conventionalized impoliteness formulae(or 75 of the 149) used at least one taboo word. Compare 
this with Culpeper's (2011,136) finding that only two of his 100 impoliteness events recorded by 
students as diary reports contained taboo words. The taboo words in our data are not only frequent 
but dominated by those perceived to be most offensive in Britain. Perhaps the most substantial 
study of people’s attitudes to taboo words and offensive language, and also the role of context, in 
Britain is Millward-Hargrave (2000). Involving a questionnaire delivered to 1,033 informants, this 
study was commissioned jointly by the Advertising Standards Authority, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), the Broadcasting Standards Commission and the Independent Television 
Commission. Table 1 displays the offensiveness rankings of taboo words in Millwood-Hargrave 
(2000) and their frequency in our data: 
 
Table 2. Taboo words and their offensiveness in religiously aggravated hate speech 
 





Frequency in our 
data 
cunt  1 11 
fuck-related  2/3 53 
nigger 5 2 
paki 10 5 
mildly taboo words 17+ 13 
 
 Culpeper (2011, 136) argues that in most cases taboo words operate in conjunction with 
impoliteness formulae in order to exacerbate them. This kind of intensification is likely to be 
represented in our records, but we should not forget that impoliteness is often intensified by 
features less likely to appear in our records, namely, prosody (e.g. wide pitch range, sharp pitch 
falls, high amplitude) and non-verbal behaviours (e.g. spitting, two or one fingered gestures, anger 
displays). However, we should bear in mind that simple intensification is not the only function 
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performed by taboo words. Example [16] illustrates some of the diversity possible with fuck-
related taboo words. 
 
[16]   I’m a fucking DOUGLAS, so don’t you fucking fuck with me 
 
Table 3 shows the functions and structures of fuck-related taboo words in our data and their 
frequencies. 
 
Table 3. Fuck-related taboo words in religiously aggravated hate crime language: Forms and functions 
[NP=noun phrase; VP=verb phrase; ADJ=adjective; ADV=adverb; PP=prepositional phrase] 
 
Function Structure Example  Freq. 
Intensifying elements fucking NP you fucking mug 21 
fucking VP we fucking hate Muslim scum 5 
fucking  fucking 2 
fucking ADJ you're all fucking dead 1 
    
Negative expressives fuck NP fuck you 10 
    
Threats don't fuck with NP don't fuck with me 3 
 fuck you [ADV] up fuck you right up 2 
 fuck up NP ready to fuck up Muslim scum 1 
    
Dismissals fuck off [PP] fuck off back to the desert 5 
    
Idiomatic expressions give a fuck I don't give a fuck 2 
 fucking hell fucking hell 1 
TOTAL   53 
 
As can be seen, the intensifying function is indeed the most frequent for fuck-related elements, and 
most often plays a role in insults (which are typically of the form "fucking NP"). However, that 
function only accounts for a little over half of the instances. Amongst the other functions, negative 
expressives (prototypical instances being curses) constitute the most prominent type. 
 
 
5. Identity attacks 
39.9% (or 67) of the total 168 coded utterances/behaviours in our data explicitly target an aspect of 
the addressee's group identity, almost always through an insult. 64.2% (43) of these identity 
attacks explicitly target a religious aspect of the addressee's identity. This is 25.6% of all coded 
utterances/behaviours. It may seem puzzling that a mere quarter of the utterances/behaviours 
explicitly involve identity, as our data were selected on the basis that they allegedly violated the 
law with respect to religious identity (see Section 2.1).What these numbers reveal is that, although 
every case in our data contains at least one religious identity attack, other kinds of impoliteness 
dominate. We can infer from this that religiously aggravated hate crime events seldom revolve 
around the performance of the language of religiously aggravated hate crime alone, but normally 
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are constituted by multiple impoliteness utterances/behaviours, of which religiously aggravated 
hate is one. Other group membership identities attacked include race, nationality, gender and 
sexuality. The remaining utterances /behaviours explicitly target personal identity aspects and 
values (e.g. "you bald cunt") or are types of impoliteness which include no explicit identity 
element (e.g. threats, dismissals and commands).That all these types of impoliteness are recorded 
in our records is a consequence not only of their relevance as the context to religiously aggravated 
offences, but also the fact that they may be violating other laws in their own right (e.g. the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the Public Order Act 1986). For example, as well as 
charges for religiously aggravated offences, 3 of the 17 cases also included charges for racially 
aggravated offences.  
 It is extremely difficult to quantify the actual or perceived religions of key parties. This 
information does not form part of CPS case documentation, but has to be inferred from comments 
participants make. For this reason, we cannot give information about general trends regarding 
participants' religious identities (or indeed any other aspect of identity). However, it is clear that 
the notionof a non-Muslim attacking a Muslim, which seemed to be the motivation for the 
development of the relevant legal framework in the first place (see Section 2.1), does not always 
apply. Other cases involved defendants and victims who were members of: 
 
  Different Christian subgroups: Catholic (by implication) and Protestant 
  Different Islamic subgroups: Shia, Sunni 
  Occultism 
 
There was also one case of a Muslim allegedly attacking a non-Muslim. Clearly, this is an area 




This is the first thorough linguistic treatment of speech manifesting as religiously aggravated 
crime in England and Wales, being, as it is, based on a unique data set. The laws of England and 
Wales framing and surrounding religiously aggravated hate crime, and also the related legal 
literature, contain no linguistic detail about what is involved, despite the fact, as noted in our data 
set, that language is central to the crime. From the perspective of impoliteness, we might add that 
that literature is not accustomed to dealing with such extreme data, something which adds 
additional interest to the fact that our approach involved impoliteness concepts and frameworks. 
 We established that such hate crime is dominated by pre-fabricated conventionalized 
impoliteness formulae. This lends support to both assumptions in the law and arguments in the 
legal literature (e.g. Walters 2013) that hate crime can be framed in terms of material that is more 
"likely" to cause offence. In addition, such impoliteness formulae may reflect a more ‘mind-less’ 
kind of impoliteness characteristic of highly emotionally charged situations, though we cannot 
discount the fact that it may also reflect a tendency for more implied kinds of impoliteness to be 
recorded less. Our analysis supports the legal literature's focus on insults. They are by far the most 
numerous act of impoliteness in relation to hate crime, offering a convenient carriage for 
connecting group identity membership with negative aspects. Moreover, we revealed that they 
primarily take the form of personalised negative vocatives (e.g. "you X") or personalized negative 
assertions (e.g. "you are an X"). A danger with the latter, we argued, is that they can blur into 
pointed criticism, with its rather different legal status, when the target is not made explicit (e.g. 
"the Y religion is X" in the presence of people of Y religion). The onus is placed on the legal 
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record to adequately represent the context, i.e. who the likely implicit targets are.  
 However, we also showed that religiously aggravated hate crime events do not just revolve 
around insults. We revealed that one of the most striking features of our data is that its numerous 
threats are never conditional threats, as is typical of many other impoliteness datasets, but are non-
conditional threats. We argued that despite expressing a future action (e.g. "I'll X you"), the key 
effect of intimidation is immediate: they put the target in fear of violence. Similarly, we argued 
that incitement, achieved via imperative or hortative structures, despite expressing a future action, 
has the immediate effect of intimidation. Interestingly, incitement, though fairly frequent in our 
data, is not part of the key laws dealing with religiously aggravated hate crime, nor, in fact, is it 
mentioned anywhere in the impoliteness literature. We also noted the potential for some 
ambiguities between incitement and negative expressives (e.g. "Fuck X"). Finally, we revealed 
that a characteristic of almost half of our impoliteness items is that they contain a taboo word, and 
moreover taboo words that are strongly offensive. They are typically deployed to intensify the 
impoliteness of insults, to maximise the offensiveness of the message, but they perform some 
other functions in our data too (e.g. negative expressives such as curses). 
 Although religious identity is targeted in each of the 17 cases of our data, only a quarter of 
all reported impoliteness utterances/behaviours involve religious identity. This lends support to the 
argument that religiously aggravated hate crime events are constituted by many types of 
impoliteness of which just some relate to religion. Other group membership identities attacked in 
during those events include race, nationality, gender and sexuality. Yet, we might note that the 
legal provisions for the protection of these groups vary considerably (gender, for example, is not 
well accommodated). The remaining utterances /behaviours not involving group membership 
identities explicitly target personal identity aspects and values (e.g. "you bald cunt") or are types 
of impoliteness which include no explicit identity element (e.g. threats, dismissals and 
commands).The fact that our data includes the performance of so many impoliteness 
utterances/behaviours outside the purview of religiously aggravated hate crime is consistent with 
the idea that it often arises in the 'heat of the moment' rather than as a conscious intention to be 
anti-religious, racist, etc. (Iganski 2008). This is not to say, of course, that ideology is not at play. 
This can most clearly be seen in our data in the idea that a key motivation for hate crime is to 
redress a grievance (Iganski 2008). The way this idea connects with our analysis begins with the 
observation that our data is dominated by insults and threats, the stuff of coercive impoliteness, 
and that participants sometimes evoked moral backing for their coercive actions: they consider 
themselves to be redressing a "wrong". We noted that this fits the notion of distributive justice 
(Tedeschi and Felson 1994, 218). What counts as a 'fair' distribution of resources and values is 
shaped by ideologies concerning religion, ethnicity, etc. 
 Turning to impoliteness, we have thoroughly demonstrated that impoliteness notions and 
frameworks are effective in describing and theorizing religiously aggravated hate crime. In some 
ways this is not surprising because, although hitherto unconnected, they share many similar issues, 
as elaborated in section 2.2. Even some specifics are shared, such as the recent movement away 
from full intention to a concern with the awareness of the likelihood of the offensive effects of a 
particular usage (Walters 2013) or a concern with its foreseeability (Culpeper 2011). However, on 
occasion in our data we have encountered phenomena that have been almost completely ignored 
by the impoliteness literature. The stand-out cases of this are non-conditional threats and 
incitement. More generally, one uncomfortable feature of bringing impoliteness to bear concerns 
nomenclature. Although, as we stated in section 2.2, we have been using "impoliteness" as a 
blanket-term for offensive behaviours, we cannot deny that that term suggests coverage of 
behaviours causing lesser offence than the ones typical of hate crime. Rudanko (2006) suggested 
This is the author accepted manuscript to appear in the Journal of Language, Aggression and Conflict. As such, it is under copyright; the publisher 
should be contacted for permission to re-use or reprint its material in any form. 
 20 
the category of "aggravated impoliteness" to address this problem. Certainly, the material in our 
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1 The other type of face devised by Spencer-Oatey (2008) is relational face. However there are 
some difficulties in separating this type from social identity face, and it also proved to be the least 
relevant type of face (Culpeper et al. 2010). 
2 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) maintains a central record of prosecution outcomes, 
including cases flagged as hate crime, through its electronic Case Management System (CMS) and 
which are extracted through the related Management Information System (MIS) database. CPS 
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data are available through its Case Management System (CMS) and associated Management 
Information System (MIS). The CPS collects data to assist in the effective management of its 
prosecution functions. The CPS does not collect data that constitutes official statistics as defined in 
the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007. These data have been drawn from the CPS' 
administrative IT system, which (as with any large scale recording system) is subject to possible 
errors with data entry and processing. The figures are provisional and subject to change as more 
information is recorded by the CPS. The CPS is committed to improving the quality of their data 
and from mid-June 2015 introduced a new data assurance regime which may explain some 
unexpected variance in some future data sets. The official statistics relating to crime and policing 
are maintained by the Home Office (HO) and the official statistics relating to sentencing, criminal 
court proceedings, offenders brought to justice, the courts and the judiciary are maintained by the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ). 
3According to the Urban Dictionary, 'sand money' means "crazy insane money, like an Arab 
Sheik". 
4This example flouts Grice's (1975) maxim of quality -- there is no evidence that the addressees 
are dead. This triggers a search for an implied meaning, a strong possibility being that the speaker 
is threatening that they will be dead. 
